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February 4, 2008 Draft

Making Sense of Nation-Level Bankruptcy Filing Rates
Ronald J. Mann*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Much of the developed world has experienced a similar pattern of spending, debt, and
insolvency over the last twenty years. First, as national income and consumer spending
rise, the level of consumer debt inevitably increases. When consumer debt becomes
commonplace, the incidence of household financial distress rises, with burgeoning rates
of insolvency not far behind.

What once was a problem only for merchants and

businesses quickly becomes a risk that confronts all classes of the populace, rich or poor.
As this pattern has played out, financial distress and insolvency have become front-page
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news around the globe.1 European countries that did not even have bankruptcy systems
twenty years ago now confront a rising tide of distress that overwhelms judicial and
administrative processes as quickly as legislatures can create them.2

1

See Adam Bennett, Bankruptcies on the Rise, Figures Show, www.news.com.au, July

10, 2007 (Australian story noting that ‘[t]he high cost of living and easy access to credit have led
to the highest number of bankruptcies in [New South Wales] for more than 20 years’); ‘Head to
Head: Is It Too Easy to Escape Debt?’ (May 9, 2007) BBC News (UK news story noting that ‘a
record number of individuals declared themselves formally insolvent last year’). ‘Sounding the
Retreat’ (July 13, 2006) The Economist, (discussing rampant ‘overindebtedness’ associated with
willingness of British to ‘borro[w] with abandon’); ‘The FSA Flinches’ (Sept. 7, 2006), The
Economist, (“Reformers worry that too many Japanese are borrowing more than they can hope to
repay.”); Shawn W. Crispin (Mar. 25, 2004), ‘Thailand Acts to Slow Down Some Lending’ Wall
Street Journal, at A15. Although the topic is newsworthy in Canada, Canadians find themselves
in the unusual situation of congratulating themselves on a recent decline in filing rates. Fewer
Canadians Going Bankrupt Despite Rising Debt Levels, Feb. 5, 2007 (government press release
suggesting that “low unemployment allowed consumers to cope with higher debt levels”).
2

See Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen (1999), ‘Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison: Do We

Cure a Market Failure of a Social Problem?’ 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 473 (discussing new
systems in Scandinavia). Udo Reifner, ‘Thou Shalt Pay Thy Debts’: Personal Bankruptcy Law
and Inclusive Contract Law’ in Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al (eds), in Consumer Bankruptcy
in Global Perspectives 143 (2004) (discussing European developments). Jason Kilborn has
produced an excellent series of case studies on new European systems. Jason J. Kilborn (2004),
‘The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief: Revolutionary Changes in German
Law, and Surprising Lessons for the United States’ 24 Nw. Journal International & Business. 257
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Yet despite a general upward trend in filing rates, stark differences in nation-level
filing rates persist.

For the most telling example, consider the United States and the

United Kingdom, the two largest English-speaking economies. In 2004, 930 out of every
million U.K. residents sought formal insolvency relief, but U.S. residents sought such
relief at a rate more than five times as high (5,500 out of every million).3 Consider

[hereinafter Kilborn, Germany]. Jason J. Kilborn (2005), La Responsabilisation de l’Economie:
‘What the United States Can Learn from the New French Law on Consumer Overindebtedness’
26 Michigan Journal of International Law 619 [hereinafter Kilborn, France]. Jason J. Kilborn
(2006), ‘The Hidden Life of Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Danger Signs for the New U.S. Law
from Unexpected Parallels in the Netherlands’ 39 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 77
[hereinafter Kilborn, Netherlands]. Jason J. Kilborn (2006), ‘Continuity, Change, and Innovation
in Emerging Consumer Bankruptcy Systems: Belgium and Luxembourg’ 14 American
Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 69. Jason J. Kilborn (2007), ‘Out with the New, in with the Old:
As Sweden Aggressively Streamlines Its Consumer Bankruptcy System, Have U.S. Reformers
Fallen off the Learning Curve’ 80 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 435 [hereinafter Kilborn,
Sweden].
3

I note Iain Ramsay’s point that comparisons of filing rates across national boundaries

are complicated not only by differences in the formal liquidation systems, but also by differences
in the possibilities for seeking relief through the multifarious rehabilitation systems, which may
be more or less formal or voluntary. Iain Ramsay (2007), ‘Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy’
Illinois Law Review 241, 260-62. In this paper, however, I cannot undertake to examine all such
systems. Instead, I focus on the major formal national-level systems. Thus, for example, I do not
include county court administration orders in the statistics for the U.K.

A complete

understanding of the U.K. pattern would require assessment of the interaction of those orders with
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Canada and Australia, the two largest Commonwealth economies. Commentators note
the similarity of their systems for providing bankruptcy relief,4 but the rate at which
Australians and Canadians seek insolvency relief differs sharply. As of 2004, there were
1300 filings per million in Australia, but more than twice as many (3100) filings per
million in Canada.
Governments concerned about rising rates of financial distress can respond in
various ways. They might try to alter individual behavior, hoping to limit financial
distress by discouraging spending.5 Alternatively, they might intervene in credit markets,

the bankruptcy and IVA systems that I do consider. It is enough for this paper to suggest (based
on the apparent magnitude of county court administration orders) that the U.K. filing rate would
remain relatively low even if I included those filings in calculating the U.K. filing rate.
4

See Anthony Duggan, ‘Consumer Bankruptcy in Canada and Australia: A Comparative

Overview’ in Janis P. Sarra (ed) Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2006 (Thompson Carswell
2007, Toronto) 857. Jacob S. Ziegel, Comparative Consumer Insolvency Regimes: A Canadian
Perspective(Oxford and Oregon Hart Publishing, 2003) 96-97.
5

That approach would not be congenial in many countries. The U.S., for example, has

depended for decades on consumer spending to drive economic growth. Lizabeth Cohen, A
Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (Knopf, Borzoi
Books Random House, 2003). Similarly, Japanese reformers focused on consumer behavior have
worried that consumer spending has been too low, not that it has been too high. Souichirou
Kozuka & Luke Nottage, ‘Re-regulating Consumer Credit in Japan: Culture, Economics and
Politics in Contemporary Law Reform’ in J. Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al. (eds) Consumer Credit,
Over-Indebtedness and Bankruptcy: National and International Dimensions (forthcoming 2008).
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hoping to limit overindebtedness at the source.6 Countries that ignore the problem face
the possibility of ending up like South Korea, which recently spent billions of dollars to
bail out leading financial institutions that faced crippling levels of default and
insolvency,7 or the United States, which faces a growing crisis centered on rapid
increases in foreclosure rates.8
Perhaps the most common response has been to amend the legal system for
dealing with financial distress. Even if financial distress is an inevitable by-product of a
modern capitalist economy,9 differences in the formal legal system affect individual
responses to financial problems. Most obviously, the rise of consumer debt in recent

6

For example, the U.K.’s Office of Fair Trading and Department of Trade and Industry

(recently superseded by the Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform) have
both been aggressive in responding to the perceived problem of overindebtedness in the U.K.
See, e.g., OFT, Consumer Credit (Advertisements) Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/827); DTI, Fair
Clear and Competitive – The Consumer Credit Market in the 21st Century (White Paper) (Cm
6040, 8th Dec. 2003).
7

See Ronald J. Mann, Charging Ahead (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 116-17.

8

See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., Statement on Subprime Mortgage

Lending (June 29, 2007), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2007/pr07055a.html.
9

See Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context,

Corporate Impact (Oxford University Press, 2002).
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decades has led to the creation of new bankruptcy systems in several continental
European jurisdictions.10
Even in countries that have had bankruptcy systems for many years, the rising
levels of insolvency in recent decades have driven major reforms.11 Policymakers have
struggled with whether – and how – to alter their systems. Hence, the U.S. has adopted
reforms designed to limit access at the same time as the U.K. and Japan have
implemented reforms to encourage more filings. Which approach is correct? Should
legislators permit access by a greater number of debtors, to encourage entrepreneurial
risk-taking? Or, should they limit access to a smaller number of debtors to lower the
moral hazard of an easy release from obligations?12 What is the best way to filter out the

10

In addition to the sources cited ‘Above in note 2’, see Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen

(1997), ‘Changing Directions in Consumer Bankruptcy Law and Practice in Europe and USA’ 20
Journal Consumer Policy 133; Charles Jordan Tabb (2005), ‘Lessons from the Globalization of
Consumer Bankruptcy’ 30 Law & Social Inquiry 762 (reviewing Consumer Bankruptcy in Global
Perspectives, ‘Above n 2’ & Ziegel, ‘Above n 4’).
11

For a collection of papers on that subject, see Part IV of Consumer Bankruptcy in

Global Perspectives, ‘Above n 2’.
12

See, e.g., Samuel A. Rea, Jr. (1984), ‘Arm-Breaking, Consumer Credit and Personal

Bankruptcy’ 22 Economic Inquiry 188; Barry Adler et al. (2000), ‘Regulating Consumer
Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry’ 29 Journal of Legal Studies 585.
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abusive filings from the “honest but unfortunate” debtors for whom policymakers design
the systems?13
The disparate responses reflect the likelihood that variations in filing rates rest on
different factors in different countries. Some of the variation is attributable to different
levels of indebtedness. Some of the variation is attributable to different cultural attitudes
about financial failure. Some of the variation is attributable to the accessibility of the
legal system as a remedy for irremediable financial distress. Some of the variation is
attributable to the availability of informal systems of relief.

Yet it is not easy to

disentangle how those different attributes affect the aggregate nation-level filing rates.
This Chapter explores the possibility that aggregate empirical data can shed light on that
question, and analyzes the policy implications of the differences in nation-level filing
rates.
First, Part II explains why it is important as a matter of policy to understand
whether high or low filing rates stem from economic, cultural, or legal causes. Without
understanding why rates are high or low, it is impossible either to assess whether the rate
of filing is too high or too low, or to design policies likely to move rates in the
appropriate direction.
Drawing on prior work about credit card markets,14 Part III uses aggregate data to
distinguish between the economic explanations for filing rates and the cultural and legal
explanations. Two findings are salient. First, the bulk of the uniquely high filing rate in

13

The phrase is from Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).

14

Mann, ‘Above n 7’.
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the United States appears to be attributable to economic conditions, not cultural attitudes
or the legal system. Second, after controlling for economic conditions, Canada’s filing
rate is by far the highest of any of the countries for which adequate data is available, the
other countries being the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia.15
Part IV offers tentative hypotheses to explain the more robust findings in Part III.
Thus, it considers both why Canada’s propensity to file is so much higher than that of the
U.S., and why Australia’s is so much lower. The discussion of Japan and the United
Kingdom is more tentative, primarily because of limitations in the data16 that make the
statistical findings considerably more ambiguous than they are for Canada, the U.S., and
Australia. Generally, I hypothesize that “back-end” issues related to the timing of a
discharge and the payments required to obtain it are relatively unimportant. “Back-end”
issues matter primarily to the relatively small sector of bankruptcy filers with significant
income or assets. For the great mass of potential filers who have little or no income or

15

I study these countries because they are the only ones for which I have been able to

obtain a sufficiently long time series of data to permit meaningful quantitative analysis.
16

In the case of the U.K., the apparent problem is that England and Wales have one

bankruptcy system, Scotland another, and Northern Ireland no system at all. Thus, statistical
models that work well in countries with nationwide bankruptcy systems do poorly in the U.K. At
least in theory I could limit my analysis to England and Wales, but the data for my control
variables extends to the entire U.K. and I have been unable to locate a time series of data for my
control variables that is limited to England and Wales. In the case of Japan, the apparent problem
is an unusually long recession that has lasted throughout the study period, so that the data does
not include filings from the same mix of economic good and bad periods as the other countries.
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assets, the most important issues are “front-end” barriers to filing, whether they come
from procedural obstacles or from cultural attitudes about financial distress.
Part V concludes with a normative assessment of those “front-end” barriers.
Because those barriers tend to bar filings by the desperately insolvent (the “low-income
low-asset” or LILA debtors), they reflect poor policy choices. The net social benefits of
returning the LILA debtors promptly to productivity support a simple and effective
system of relief for those debtors.
II.

WHY THE REASONS MATTER

The first step in analyzing nation-level filing rates is to confront the matrix of factors that
affect those rates. Although a rigid categorization is arbitrary, it is useful to distinguish
among three different types of factors, each of which relates to financial distress and
bankruptcy in a different way and each of which has different policy implications.
A.

Legal Explanations

Although I am predisposed to doubt the importance of purely legal explanations,17 I start
there, primarily because of the conventional wisdom that legal explanations are central to
the problem. The intuition relies on a rational actor conception of the debtor: fewer
debtors file for bankruptcy in countries with bankruptcy systems that offer relief that is
less generous, and more debtors file for bankruptcy in countries that offer relief that is
more generous. The analytical premise is that the bankruptcy discharge provides an
economic benefit to those that file, and systems in which the benefit is greater should

17

See Mann, ‘Above n 7, at 96-98’ (explaining that differences in legal protections have

little relation to the pattern of debit and credit card use).
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produce more filings.18 The literature written from this perspective suggests that the key
variables in explaining filing rates are the ready availability of a discharge, the types of
debts excepted from the discharge, and the scope of required post-bankruptcy
payments.19
That explanation is consistent with the U.S. filing rate. The world’s highest filing
rate is associated with a system in which a discharge is almost automatically and
immediately available and with no general requirement of post-bankruptcy payments to
creditors. Similarly, Michelle White’s work shows that the propensity to file is higher in
U.S. jurisdictions with higher exemption levels and thus more generous bankruptcy
relief.20
The conclusion that the level of filing rates depends for the most part on the legal
system makes it easy to adopt responsive policies. For example, countries like the U.K.
18

Michelle White’s work provides the most careful support for this line of reasoning,

showing that more debtors file in United States jurisdictions in which exemptions are higher.
Scott Fay, Erik Hurst & Michelle J. White (2002), ‘The Household Bankruptcy Decision’ 92
American Economic Review 708; Michelle J. White (1998), ‘Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy:
A Critical Look at Incentives Under U.S. Bankruptcy Laws and a Proposal for Change’ 65 U.
Chicago Law Review 685 ([hereinafter White, Why It Pays to File]; Michelle J. White (1998),
‘Why Don’t More Households File for Bankruptcy?’ 14 Journal of Law Economics &
Organization 205 [hereinafter White, Why Don’t More Households File?].
19

See Fay, Hurst & White, ibid n 18; White, ‘Why It Pays to File’, ibid n 18; White,

‘Why Don’t More Households File?’ ibid n 18.
20

See White, ‘Why It Pays to File’, ‘Above n 18’.
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and Japan seek higher rates of bankruptcy filings to speed the resolution of financial
distress.

Those countries need only provide a discharge more promptly, lower

requirements for post-bankruptcy payments, or increase the level of exempt assets.
Conversely, legislators concerned that spiraling filing rates reflect abuse should interpose
obstacles to the discharge or increase the likelihood that filers will be obligated to make
post-bankruptcy payments to their creditors.
B.

Cultural Explanations

A second possibility recognizes the interaction between the formal legal system and the
society in which it is embedded. Cultural predispositions might affect the decision to file
for bankruptcy, and those predispositions may differ from country to country. That
perspective recognizes that the decision to file for bankruptcy is a permanent one that will
have lifelong consequences for the individual that makes it. Hence, if this explanation
were important, filing decisions should diverge from those predicted by a rational-actor
conception of the bankruptcy decision: individuals might refrain from filing for irrational
“emotional” reasons even if the benefits available to them from a bankruptcy filing
exceeded the out-of-pocket costs connected with the filing.
Cultural attitudes about bankruptcy also should affect the legal system itself. Iain
Ramsay reminds us that legislators adopt laws that reflect the cultural dispositions that
prevail among their constituents and the interest groups that are influential in their
jurisdiction.21 For example, UK leaders could embrace bankruptcy reform because of a

21

See Iain D.C. Ramsay (2006), ‘Functionalism and Political Economy in the

Comparative Study of Consumer Insolvency: An Unfinished Story from England and Wales’ 7
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“strong admiration” for a “vibrant enterprise culture” that involved “responsible risk
taking.”22 At the same time, concerns that relief for nonbusiness debtors was an entirely
different matter made it important for the Government to emphasize its opposition to “a
safety net for overindebted consumers.”23 In this vein, Rafael Efrat argues that cultural
attitudes about entrepreneurs explain a great deal of the variation in the formal legal
systems for consumer bankruptcy.24
Although those types of effects are difficult to measure directly, proxies might
shed light on the differing levels of cultural resistance to bankruptcy in different nations.
In the existing literature, for example, cultural explanations gain powerful empirical
support from data about United States filings. Specifically, Michelle White’s work
indicates that about 15% of all households would benefit in economic terms from filing
for bankruptcy, but only about 1% file for bankruptcy in any given year.25 The size of
the gap suggests that the rational-actor conception captures little of the motivations for
filing; it is reasonable to infer that a portion of the gap is attributable to cultural resistance
to bankruptcy filing.
Journal of Theoretical Inquiries Law 625 [hereinafter Ramsay, Functionalism and Political
Economy].
22

Ramsay, ibid n 21, at 17-18.

23

Id. at 18.

24

See Rafael Efrat (2002), ‘Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy’, 76 American

Bankruptcy Law Journal 81.
25

See White, ‘Why Don’t More Households File?’ ‘Above n 18’.
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Although there is a long tradition of designing social programs in a way that
stigmatizes their use,26 it is not clear how often legislators succeed. The mere existence
of a national bankruptcy system legitimates bankruptcy filing to a considerable degree.27
Similarly, high levels of overindebtedness are likely to create a culture in which
bankruptcy filing necessarily becomes more culturally acceptable.28 As more individuals
use a bankruptcy system to resolve their financial problems and move forward with their
lives, a larger and larger share of the populace will be acquainted with people for whom
that choice turned out to be a good one. This in turn will weaken norms that regard
bankrupts as an “other” class of people held in general disdain. Moreover, as suggested
above, cultural predispositions motivate legislatures as well. Thus, in a society in which
compassion for bankrupts becomes widespread, it may become increasingly difficult for
legislators to treat bankrupts harshly.

26

27

See Christopher Howard, The Hidden Welfare State (Princeton University Press, 1999)
The distinction from welfare is instructive, where stigmatized public assistance

programs can be relegated to local authorities. The commitment to a bankruptcy system, by
contrast, occurs at the national level. Interestingly, to the extent the United States system has
delegated authority to the local standing Chapter 13 trustees, a case can be made that the result
has been “local legal culture” that in some locales stigmatizes Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings. See
Teresa Sullivan et al. (1994) ‘The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence
from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts’ 17 Harvard Journal Law Public Policy 801.
28

See Jean Braucher (2006) ‘Theories of Over-Indebtedness: Interaction of Structure and

Culture’ 7 Journal Theoretical Inquiries Law 323.
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C.

Economic Explanations

The final possibility resonates with the opening paragraphs of this paper, connecting the
increase in financial distress and bankruptcy filings to the rapid increase in consumer
debt (and especially credit card debt) in most developed countries. The premise of this
explanation is that bankruptcy filings for the most part are the result of exogenous
shocks, which result in financial distress that would lead to filings in most cases without
regard to legal or cultural factors.
If this explanation were important, the most significant predictors of nation-level
filing rates would be consumer debt, credit card debt, and general economic conditions.
Again, United States data support this theory. It is striking that the United States for
years has experienced both the highest level of credit card debt in the world and the
highest bankruptcy filing rate. Econometric models that scholars have used to illustrate
connections between rising debt levels and increased filing rates buttress that intuition.29
Economic explanations would support intervention in the consumer credit
markets. For example, a jurisdiction concerned about excessive insolvency might adopt
regulations that limited the profitability of lending to those in severe financial distress,
hoping to truncate that lending without undue distortion of the payment system or the
broader lending market.30

29

See Mann, ‘Above n 7, at 45-72’ (summarizing and extending that literature).

30

See Mann, ‘Above n 7, at 119-206’ (detailed proposals for intervention in consumer

credit markets in the U.S.).
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III.

ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON FILING RATES

The starting point in empirical analysis of consumer bankruptcy systems is the wide
disparity in filing rates across national borders. Figure 1 illustrates the magnitude of the
disparity, setting out the number of filings per million of population in each of five
countries as of 2004 (the last year for which complete data is available). Recognizing the
important differences between the legal systems in these countries, Figure 1 provides two
data points for each country.

The first is the number of liquidation or “straight”

bankruptcy filings. The first number is the total number of all insolvency filings, which
includes both the number of liquidation or “straight” bankruptcy filings and also the
applicable systems for “rehabilitations” or “proposals” or “plans.”31 Each of the five
countries has both types of system.32 The second number separates out the number of
liquidation or straight “bankruptcy” filings.
In isolation, Figure 1 suggests that the U.S. has by far the highest rate of filing,
with steadily decreasing filing rates in Canada, Japan, Australia, and the U.K. Although

31

The Appendix includes a more complete set of charts showing a time series of those

filings for each country from 1990 to the present.
32

As Figure 1 illustrates, including or omitting rehabilitation filings does not alter the

relative number of filings for any country except the United States, which has a much higher
share of rehabilitation filings than other countries. The more common use of the rehabilitation
system in the U.S. may be attributed in part to the maturity of the Chapter 13 system and in part
to the value of that system for retaining home and automobile ownership. In none of the other
countries in my study would the rehabilitation filing interfere with the ability of a lender to pursue
collateral such as a home or automobile.
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the disparity is striking, it should be clear from the discussion above that the raw numbers
say little about the cause of the disparity. Without further information, it is impossible to
tell whether the disparity relates to differences in the systems themselves or rather to
cultural differences or differences in economic conditions.
FIGURE 1: 2004 INSOLVENCIES PER MILLION OF POPULATION

As it happens, it is possible to identify the economic factors that affect the level of
insolvency filings in a particular jurisdiction. In prior work focused on the relation
between credit card debt and financial distress, I developed a model that documents a
strong and significant relation between changes in the level of credit card debt and
changes in bankruptcy filings. The model used credit card debt, credit card spending,
total consumer debt, and unemployment (as independent variables) to explain the number
of bankruptcy filings (as the dependent variable). Generally, the data suggest, an increase
of $100 in credit card debt per capita will be followed one year later by an increase in

- 16 -
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bankruptcy filings of about 200 per million.33 As the magnitude of the filing rates in
Figure 1 illustrates, that effect is large enough to have substantial practical significance.
As I worked with the data I began to explore how the effect differed from country
to country. Even when I added variables (country dummies) to isolate country-specific
effects, however, the relation between credit card debt and bankruptcy filings remained
significant. What led me to this project was the surprising finding that the U.S. was not
at the top of the scale. Specifically, controlling for economic conditions, the coefficient
on the United States variable did not suggest that there is a higher propensity to file in the
United States than in the other countries. Intrigued by that finding, for this project I
updated the data used in that work (to reflect additional years of filings) and also
segregated the data to permit separate analysis of liquidation filings, rehabilitation filings,
and total filings. My intuition was that data about liquidation filings might be more
useful than data about total filings, at least in part because rehabilitation filings in many
countries are more closely related to informal or voluntary resolution schemes.
Moreover, stark differences in the relation between rehabilitation filings and secured
credit suggest that those filings might be used for such different purposes in different
countries as to make cross-border comparisons meaningless.34 Ultimately, the central

33

See Mann, ‘Above n 7, at chapter 5’.

34

A Chapter 13 filing in the United States is commonly used to prevent a foreclosure on a

home or repossession of an automobile. In none of the other countries in this study would a
rehabilitation filing bring with it an automatic stay that would grant that protection.

This

differential benefit from a Chapter 13 filing is a good explanation for why the rate of
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inquiry should relate to total filings in countries (like the United States) in which the big
step is to seek any type of formal insolvency relief. By contrast, in countries in which a
rehabilitation filing is culturally and legally less significant (Japan, for example), it would
be better to examine the smaller number of people that take the more complete step of
filing a “straight” or liquidation bankruptcy. The tables and regression analysis in this
Chapter consider both metrics.
As summarized in Table 1,35 Canada moves to the top of the list once the creditrelated variables are accounted for, at least for total filings and liquidation filings. As the
more detailed information in the Appendix explains, large standard errors suggest that the
estimates of the coefficients on the country dummies are relatively imprecise.36 The
relations are statistically significant only for the United States and for Australia, and in
Australia only for liquidation filings. Still, the pattern of negative coefficients is striking:
the coefficients are negative for each country’s total filing propensity and its liquidation
rehabilitation filings in the United States is significantly higher than the rate in Canada, although
the rates of liquidation and total filings are higher in Canada than in the United States.
35

Although Table 1 does not report it, the results confirm and extend the analysis

reported in Charging Ahead, because credit card debt remains highly significant with a
substantial positive coefficient in all of the different runs, generally significant at a .001 level.
Talbe A1 in the Appendix includes more detailed output.
36

It would be surprising if the model did capture all of the variation because there have

been substantial bankruptcy reforms in several of the countries during the period of the study. As
discussed ‘Above note 16’, problems with the U.K. and Japanese data make it easy to see why the
model does not produce significant results for those variables.
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filing propensity.

This suggests that, faced with similar patterns of debt and

unemployment, the bankruptcy filing rate would be higher in Canada than in any of the
other countries. To put it another way, the data suggest that the high filing rate of the
U.S. is largely attributable to the economic conditions captured in the model. Once we
control for those conditions, the U.S. gives way to Canada as the nation with the highest
propensity to file. This presents a new puzzle for analysis: why, holding economic
conditions equal, Canada should have such a higher “propensity” to file than the USA
and Australia. For convenience of exposition, the remainder of the paper uses the term
“propensity” to reflect this analysis – the extent to which the per capita filing rate in a
country is affected by variables other than economic conditions. The next section of the
Chapter explores that puzzle.
TABLE 1: COUNTRY EFFECTS ON INDIVIDUAL BANKRUPTCY FILINGS37

37

COUNTRY

TOTAL

LIQU.

REHAB.

USA

__**

__**

+*

Japan

__

__

+

Australia

__

__#

__

UK

__

__

+

N

51

69

51

R2

.93

.93

.97

Minus signs indicate a negative coefficient; plus signs indicate a positive coefficient.

** indicates significance at the 1% level, * at the 5% level, and # at the 10% level. Table A1 in
the Appendix includes more detailed information about the regressions.
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IV.

THE PATTERN OF INDIVIDUAL BANKRUPTCY FILINGS

The point of Part III is that the economic precursors of bankruptcy filings are the easiest
to discern and quantify. The object of this part is to resolve the two puzzles most clearly
suggested by Table 1: why Canada’s propensity to file is so much higher than that of the
United States and Australia.38
Because the cultural factors are the hardest to quantify, this Part begins by
identifying features of the legal systems that are likely to explain the disparities set out in
Table 1. The discussion generally rests on three hypotheses. First, the ease or speed of
“back-end” legal factors like the discharge is not useful in explaining filing rates.
Second, the legal factors with the largest effect on filing rates are “front-end” factors such
as the procedural barriers or obstacles to filing; this factor is central to explaining the
difference between Canada and the U.S.39 Third, where no pattern of legal differences
appears, it is reasonable to consider whether the residual cause is a strong cultural
predisposition.
A.

Why Is the Canadian Propensity to File Higher than the U.S. Propensity?

The most intriguing problem is to explain the disparity in filing propensity between
Canada and the U.S. Examining the two countries’ systems at a very high level of
38

Given the ambiguity of the findings related to the U.K. and Japan, I leave that subject

to another day.
39

For a similar argument about German filing rates, see Götz Gechner et al., ‘Consumer

Bankruptcy in Germany’, in Consumer Credit, Over-Indebtedness and Bankruptcy: National and
International Dimensions,(forthcoming 2008) ‘Above n 5’.
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generality, they provide a good empirical test of the hypotheses about front-end and backend factors. First, the U.S. discharge is considerably more generous than the Canadian
discharge, which would support a lower Canadian filing propensity if the terms of
discharge were the most important factor. Conversely, the Canadian bankruptcy process
is relatively more accessible than the American process, which would support a higher
Canadian filing propensity if accessibility were the most important factor.

My

conclusion is that the data support the hypothesis that accessibility is a more important
predictor of propensity than the generosity of the discharge. Again, tying the analysis
back to Part III, the argument is that, once we account for the markedly higher level of
credit card debt in the United States, we would expect Canada’s filing rate to differ from
that of the U.S. even more than it does. The reason that it does not is that Canada’s
relatively accessible bankruptcy system discourages less filers than the relatively
inaccessible U.S. system.
On the first point, the United States system offers a faster and almost
unconditional discharge, with a stay automatically effective upon filing40 and a discharge
available in theory immediately and in practice after a few months.41 By contrast,

40

BAPCPA did introduce revisions that limit the automatic effectiveness of the stay, but

those apply only to repeat filers. See Bankruptcy Code § 362(c)(3) (automatic stay against certain
creditors lasts only thirty days for certain repeat filers) & (4) (no automatic stay for certain
multiple repeat filers).
41

To be sure, the United States has more exceptions to discharge than the other countries

I study. See William C. Whitford (1997), ‘Changing Definitions of Fresh Start in American
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Canada, like most countries, does not permit an immediate discharge.

Rather, the

discharge cannot be considered for nine months and often involves an unstructured
judicial assessment of a report filed by the bankruptcy trustee.42 To be sure, challenges to
discharge are infrequent, apparently affecting far less than one-fifth of the cases.43 Yet,
the fact remains that the delay of the discharge and the risk that it will not be granted

Bankruptcy Law’ 20 Journal of Consumer Policy 179. But those exceptions seem to me backend issues less likely to affect the decision to file.
42

BIA § 170; see Stephanie Ben-Ishai, ‘Discharge’, in S. Ben-Ishai & A. Duggan (eds)

Canadian Bankruptcy & Insolvency Law 357, 358-60 (Lexis Nexis Canada, 2007). Duggan,
‘Above n 4, at 873-76’. Similarly, the Canadian process includes rules under which debtors with
substantial “surplus” income must make periodic payments to their creditors. Apparently about
one-fourth of Canadian debtors make such payments. See Stephanie Ben-Ishai, ‘Means-Testing’
in Canadian Bankruptcy & Insolvency Law, (Lexis Nexis Canada, 2007) ‘Above at 343, 353’.
Duggan, ‘Above at 864’. Ben-Ishai emphasizes that this leaves the system more accessible than
the U.S. system “because debtors with surplus income are still able to move through the
bankruptcy process, they are not directly prevented from accessing the fresh start offered by a
liquidation bankruptcy or forced into an enforced payment plan.” Id. at 355.
43

Ramsay reports 1994 data in which about 15% of applications were opposed. Iain

Ramsay (1999), ‘Individual Bankruptcy: Preliminary Findings of a Socio-Legal Analysis’ 37
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 15, 24. Ziegel reports data indicating that out of 83,000 1998
discharge applications, 93% of debtors received an unconditional discharge, 7% a suspended
discharge, and less than 1% received conditional discharges or were denied discharges. Ziegel,
‘Above n 4, at 39.
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unconditionally are quite different from the U.S. experience, where objections to
discharge are rare.
On the other hand, the procedures for instituting a bankruptcy in Canada are much
simpler than the United States procedures.

The prospective bankrupt initiates the

proceeding by filing a simple standard-form assignment.

The fee is CAN$75 for

summary administration (cases with less than $10,000 in assets, more than 90% of all
cases44) and CAN$150 for regular administration.45 The typical consumer bankrupt does
not retain an attorney, though it must pay the fees of the trustee.46 There is no mandatory
examination by creditors, and no “abuse” provision that might force the debtor to use the
alternative “proposal” system.47

There is a mandatory counseling requirement

(introduced in 1992), but it occurs after the filing, not before.48 In the United States, the
process is much more cumbersome. The forms are considerably more complex, and
BAPCPA has only made them more so. Indeed, it is clear that the timing of bankruptcy
filings is affected to a considerable extent by the need to collect the information

44

Ziegel, ‘Above n 4, at 19’.

45

BIA Rules § 132; Duggan, ‘Above n 4, at 870’.

46

Ziegel, ‘Above n 4, at 18’. It is difficult to generalize about the levels of Canadian

trustee fees, which in some cases might approximate the fees of U.S. attorneys. See ‘Below note
50’.
47

Ziegel, ‘Above n 4, at 20-21’.

48

BIA §§ 66.13, 157.1; Duggan, ‘Above n 4, at 887-90’.

- 23 -

February 4, 2008 Draft
necessary to complete the requisite forms.49 Thus, although there is no legal requirement
that filers retain an attorney or trustee, the overwhelming majority choose to do so.
Interestingly, it is not clear that the out-of-pocket costs of filing differ substantially in the
two countries.50
The juxtaposition of those distinctions with the substantial difference in
propensity to file provides powerful support for the hypotheses about legal precursors. If
the economic features of the discharge and future income payments – the “back-end”
effects of bankruptcy – were an important precursor of a high propensity to file, then it is
surprising that they weigh so heavily against a relatively high propensity to file in
Canada. Conversely, the difference between Canada’s streamlined procedures and the
burdensome procedural obstacles in the United States cuts in the same direction as the
propensity data presented in Part III.
B.

Why Is the Canadian Propensity to File Higher Than the Australian?

The second puzzle is how to distinguish Australia from Canada. As Part III illustrates,
economic conditions have little to do with the difference.
49

The difference between

This also has become more significant after BAPCPA. I rely here on an ongoing series

of qualitative interviews with bankruptcy professionals conducted for a project with Katie Porter
on the triggers of bankruptcy filings.
50

Although the U.S. filing fees are much lower, the costs of trustees in Canada well

might exceed the costs of attorneys in the U.S. At the same time, it appears that U.S. attorneys
are much more likely to require up-front payment than Canadian trustees. Jacob Ziegel, ‘Indigent
Debtors and Financial Accessibility of Consumer Insolvency Regimes’ in Janis P. Sarra (ed)
Annual Review of Insolvency Law (Thomson Canada Limited, 2005) 500-504.
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Australia and Canada in Table 1 (the propensity to file after accounting for economic
conditions) is roughly equivalent to the difference in raw filing rates illustrated in Figure
1. The next question is whether legal or cultural factors can explain the difference.
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1.

The Failure of Legal Explanations

As other scholars have noted, it is difficult to discern credible explanations based on the
bankruptcy systems themselves.51 First, the “back-end” portions of those systems are
quite similar. For example, the Australian discharge (historically available after twelve
months of surplus income payments)52 closely resembles the Canadian discharge
available after nine months.53 Because Australia’s propensity to file is so much lower
than Canada’s, it is hard to put much weight on the discharge as an explanation.54 Nor do
51

See ‘Above n 4’.

52

Surplus income payments are even less common in Australia than in Canada. See Jean

Braucher, ‘A Comparative Study of Repayment Forms of Individual Bankruptcy’ in Consumer
Credit,

Over-Indebtedness

and

Bankruptcy:

National

and

International

Dimensions,

(forthcoming) ‘Above n 5’ reporting a substantial increase in payments, up to 12% of all filings,
as compared to more than 20% of filings in Canada).
53

Australia’s discharge period was lengthened to three years in 2002. See Duggan,

‘Above n 4, at 877’. But Australian rates were much lower than Canada’s even before that
change. Moreover, as Figure A1 illustrates, the slight (and apparently temporary) decline in
filings after 2002 is a small fraction of the aggregate difference between Canadian and Australian
filing rates.
54

Recent Japanese reforms (intended to encourage bankruptcy filings) suggest that the

nature of the discharge is similarly unimportant in explaining the low Japanese filing rate. See
Junichi Matsushita (2006), ‘Comprehensive Reform of Japanese Personal Insolvency Law’ 7
Journal of Theoretical Inquiries Law 555, 560-64 (summarizing those reforms). Although it is
too early to be sure (because of the slow process Japan follows for issuing bankruptcy statistics),
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procedural obstacles offer anything to explain the distinction.55 Australia’s system for
initiating bankruptcies is for the most part quite similar to that of Canada; if anything it
appears to be more accessible than Canada’s not less.56 Professor Ziegel explains, “the
important point worth stressing here is that it is even easier – and certainly much cheaper
– for Australian debtors to initiate bankruptcy proceedings than it is for a Canadian

the early evidence – a substantial decline in 2005 bankruptcy filings – at least suggests that these
reforms will solve little of Japan’s problem. To be sure, the improvement in Japan’s economy
beginning in 2004 might have caused some of that decline. However, an obvious alternative
hypothesis supported by the experience in other countries is that the 2004 reforms – which
emphasize increasing exempt assets and broadening the discharge – do little to address the heart
of what keeps Japan’s filings low: the expensive and cumbersome process for gaining access to
bankruptcy.
55

Procedural obstacles do offer a potential explanation for the low filing rates in the U.K.

and Japan. See Ziegel, ‘Above n 4, at 112-13’ (discussing onerous procedures in Great Britain);
see Kent Anderson & Makoto Ito, ‘Insolvency Law for a New Century: Japan’s New Framework
for Economic Failures’ in Dan Foote (ed) Law in Japan: Into the 21st Century (2003) (discussing
onerous process for instituting consumer bankruptcy in Japan, which includes judicial scrutiny for
eligibility and traditionally has not included an automatic stay); Matsushita, ‘Above n 54, at 561’.
Pre-screening of consumer bankruptcy petitions is not unique to Japan. It also is a common
feature of Nordic bankruptcy systems. See Kilborn, Sweden, ‘Above n 2, at 443-444’.
56

Ziegel repeatedly notes the difference in filing rates, but does not undertake to explain

it. Ziegel, ‘Above n 4, at 94, 106’.
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debtor.”57 For example, a bankrupt commences a case by completing a short standard
form of assignment.

The only substantive filing requirement is that the debtor be

insolvent. Australia offers a summary administration process with no creditor’s meeting
for cases with less than $10,000 in assets (which applies to about 90% of Australian
cases). Moreover, debtors typically do not use attorneys or private trustees; rather the
Official Trustee administers the case, collecting its fee from the estate and relying on a
public subsidy to administer no-asset cases.58
2.

Cultural Explanations

If neither economic explanations nor legal explanations are fruitful, an obvious
possibility is that cultural explanations provide an explanation for the observed pattern.
Because cross-border cultural explanations are inherently nebulous (like dark matter),
any such explanation necessarily is speculative. That is particularly true here, where the
cultural factors would have to be remarkably powerful to explain the disparities identified
in Figure 1 and Table 1. Still, the juxtaposition of nearly identical legal systems and
similar economic conditions with starkly different filing rates justifies exploration of the
possibility.
One objective place to look for indicators of a strong cultural disposition against
bankruptcy is statutes that impose substantial legal disabilities on those who file for
57

Ziegel, ‘Above n 4, at 96-97’.

Tony Duggan and Jean Braucher share Ziegel’s

perspective. See Duggan, ‘Above n 4, at 869-72’; Braucher, ‘Above n 52’.
58

See Braucher, ‘Above note 52’; Duggan, ‘Above note 4 at 868-69’. Rosalind Mason &

John Duns, ‘Developments in Consumer Bankruptcy in Australia’ in Consumer Bankruptcy in
Global Perspectives, (‘Above n 2, 227, 232-34’.
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bankruptcy.

Such statutes could persist only in a society with a strong cultural

disposition against bankruptcy.59 Here, there is some evidence to suggest that Australian
society takes a harsher perspective than Canada. In contrast to Canadian law, which
imposes no substantial disabilities, Australian bankrupts forfeit their passports when they
file.60
One intriguing suggestion comes from Iain Ramsay, who argues that we observe
high filing rates in countries (like Canada and the U.S.) in which private professionals
assist bankrupts in initiating proceedings because those professionals have an economic
incentive to raise awareness of the bankruptcy process. By contrast, Ramsay argues, we
observe low filing rates in countries (like Australia and the U.K.) that rely entirely on
public officers to assist filers, because those officers have a significantly lower incentive

59

The U.K. provides a startling example. Until the Enterprise Act reforms in 2004, the

U.K. bankrupt was subject to numerous serious civil disabilities, akin to those typically imposed
on felons. Among other things, British bankrupts (at least before the 2002 Enterprise Act became
effective in 2004) could not be a Member of Parliament, Justice of the Peace, company director,
chairman of a land tribunal, school governor, estate agent, charity trustee, or even a practicing
solicitor or insolvency practitioner. See Adrian Walters (2005), ‘Personal Insolvency Law After
the Enterprise Act: An Appraisal’ 5 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 65, 82-83.
60

Bankruptcy Act 1966 § 272; see Duggan, ‘Above n 4, at 892’. It is unclear how

important this ban is in practice. Apparently Australians usually can travel abroad after seeking
permission from the trustee. Still, the formal requirement is quite stigmatizing.
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to publicize the process.61 It is difficult to evaluate that perspective as an overarching
explanation. For example, given the low esteem for lawyers and the legal process in the
U.S., many would regard the practical need for lawyers in the U.S. bankruptcy process as
an obstacle. A purely administrative process might in practice be much more accessible.
On the other hand, I take Ramsay’s central point to be that the private
professionals are central in increasing public awareness and receptivity to the bankruptcy
process. Even in the U.S. advertising by lawyers appears to play a role in developing a
cultural perception of bankruptcy as a routine solution to financial distress.62 If that is the
significance of private professionals, then it is hard to be sure that their appearance is not
an effect of a relatively receptive culture rather than a cause. In either case, Ramsay’s
thesis is consistent with the pattern I identify here.63

61

Ramsay, ‘Above n 3’. see Duggan, ‘Above n 4, at 893’ (tentative endorsement of

Ramsay’s hypothesis).
62

That certainly is something for which consumer bankruptcy lawyers routinely are

criticized. See Ronald J. Mann (2007), ‘Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card
Debt’ Illinois Law Review 375, 375.
63

As Tony Duggan has pointed out to me, Ramsay’s thesis leaves unexplained why a

culture that is by hypothesis so opposed to bankruptcy would embrace a legal system that on its
face is so receptive to bankruptcy. One obvious possibility is that Australia tolerated such a
system because filing rates remained low. When filing rates rose in the late 1990’s to levels that
were remarkably high by Australian standards (though still far below typical rates for the U.S.
and Canada), Australia responded by restricting the relief available to those that file.
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*****
In a way, the central puzzle the data presents is why Canada’s propensity to file is
so high, given relatively low levels of debt. One possibility could be that Canadian debt
is riskier or more perilous in some way that aggregate data cannot reveal, so that the same
level of credit card and other borrowings in Canada would result in higher bankruptcy
filings than in other countries. However, the best evidence about global credit card
markets makes that hypothesis implausible. If anything, Canada’s use of payment cards
appears to be considerably more benign than the use in the United States and Australia.64
That suggests that we must look to legal or cultural explanations. With respect to the
United States, the most salient distinction that would explain a relatively higher
propensity to file is Canada’s decision to make its bankruptcy system so accessible,
particularly for those in more desperate condition. With respect to Australia, distinctions
are even more elusive because it is difficult to identify any feature of the legal system that
makes Canada’s bankruptcy system more accessible than Australia’s. Recognizing that
the inquiry is speculative, it does suggest that cultural predispositions against bankruptcy
are remarkably stronger in Australia than in Canada, reinforced by the greater presence of
marketing and advertising in Canada.

suggested above, see ‘Above n 53’, it is not yet clear that those reforms will have a permanent or
substantial effect on filing rates.
64

Compared to the United States market, Canada’s use of debit cards is much more

common and its level of borrowing in payments transactions is much lower. See Mann, ‘Above n
7 chs. 9-10’.
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V.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The analysis in Parts III and IV is descriptive, an attempt to understand the causal
relationships between institutional precursors of individual bankruptcy filings and the
different filing rates we observe around the world. That discussion, however, does have
normative significance. By exposing the reasons for the different rates, it explicates the
social impact of existing legal systems as well as the potential gains (and losses) from
reforms. Because the focus of this project is the legal systems for consumer bankruptcy,
this Part of the Chapter emphasizes the legal explanations rather than the cultural
explanations.65
If we set cultural explanations to the side, the most important conclusion in Part
IV is that nation-level filing rates depend much more on front-end procedural obstacles to
filing than they do on back-end issues about the timing and conditions of a final
discharge. This was surprising at first, because it is in considerable tension with the
conventional understanding that high filings plague the U.S. system because of its undue
laxity. Yet on reflection, two points make this finding easier to accept.
The first is a behavioral point, that the typical potential bankrupt will pay more
attention to those parts of the legal system that are more immediate and less to those that
will not have direct effects until weeks or months after a bankruptcy filing. The typical
client will be more concerned about the detailed financial records to be produced and the

65

I have argued in prior work that it is a poor policy choice to influence bankruptcy filing

rates by enhancing cultural predispositions against filing. Mann, ‘Above note 7, ch. 15’; Ronald
J. Mann (2006), ‘Optimizing Consumer Credit Markets and Bankruptcy Policy’ 7 Journal of
Theoretical Inquiries Law 353.
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$700-$1000 to be paid up front, than about the lawyer’s estimation of the months or years
that might pass before the proceeding is finally concluded. This distinction is implicit in
my characterization throughout this paper of procedural obstacles as front-end attributes
and discharge and payment issues as back-end attributes. The individual’s reaction to the
immediate and remote attributes of the bankruptcy process differs little from the
individual’s reaction to the immediate and remote attributes of complex products like cell
phones, health clubs, and credit cards.66
The second relates to the attributes of the universe of potential bankrupts. Rules
about income payments and conditions of discharge have relatively little significance for
those who have no income or assets, because whatever the law says they are unlikely in
fact to make substantial payments to creditors or to suffer in a material way from postbankruptcy collection activity. Those issues matter, rather, to the relatively well-off
subset of filers for whom future payment obligations are realistic.

Conversely,

procedural obstacles will matter the most to those without income or assets. A $1,000
bill for costs and fees of filing a bankruptcy petition is much more likely to slow a filing
by a desperate bankrupt with no income or assets than it is a filing by middle-class
debtors with steady income but no realistic possibility of meeting their financial
obligations. Moreover, the desperately insolvent have relatively little to gain from a

66

See Stefano Dellavigna & Ulrike Malmendier (2004), ‘Contract Design and Self-

Control: Theory and Evidence’ 119 Quarterly Journal of Econics 353; Xavier Gabaix & David
Laibson (2006), ‘Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in
Competitive Markets’ 121 Quarterly Journal of Econics 505; Mann, ‘Above n 7, ch. 12’; Ronald
J. Mann (2006), ‘“Contracting” for Credit’ 104 Michigan Law Review 899.
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bankruptcy filing (at least in an economic sense). They will pay little or nothing on their
debts in any event. For them, the immediate gain from a bankruptcy filing comes from
the possibility that creditors might harass them less after they file. The relatively well-off
middle-class filers have the most to gain in economic terms, because the bankruptcy
process allows them to protect assets or income from creditors who might be able to force
payment absent a discharge in bankruptcy.
With respect to the U.S., the Consumer Bankruptcy Project shows that a great
many of those who actually file have very little income and few assets. For example, as
of 2001, the median household income of debtors in the Consumer Bankruptcy Project
was only $20,172; 41% were below the poverty line.67 Asset values are harder to judge,
because about half of U.S. bankrupts have homes. Considering non real-estate assets (the
only likely sources for distributions to creditors), the median value of assets was less than
$10,000, far below the median value for all families (more than $40,000).68
The Consumer Bankruptcy Project, however, does not say anything about how
many more people, similarly desperate, are excluded from the system by the procedural
obstacles discussed above. The best evidence of the size of that population will be
evident whenever post-BAPCPA filing rates become sufficiently stable to allow us to
discern the size of the decline attributable to that statute. Figure A5 shows the total

67

See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook (2006), ‘Less

Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in
Bankruptcy Filings’ 59 Stanford Law Review 213, 222-23.
68

See id. at 226-27.
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filings in the United States over time, with a data point for 2007 extrapolated from the
data for the first half of 2007. As the figure suggests, the filing rate almost two years
after the effective date of BAPCPA remains substantially below the filing rate before
BAPCPA. Thus, although it is still too early to speculate on the ultimate size of the gap,
it is increasingly clear that there will be some gap, that the post-BAPCPA filing rate will
remain below the pre-BAPCPA filing rate for the foreseeable future.69 Because the most
important provisions of BAPCPA that are likely to affect the filing rate are provisions
designed to increase the procedural obstacles to bankruptcy,70 the size of that drop
suggests the significance of this group to the total filing rate.
If marginal filers with no substantial assets or income are a large portion of the
potential bankrupts, marginal filers also are those for whom there is the greatest
divergence between the private and social value of the bankruptcy filing. As discussed
above, the economic value of a bankruptcy filing for a debtor with little income and few
assets is relatively small, because the debtor gains relatively little from the discharge.
However, the net social value of the discharge is considerable. On the one hand, the
discharge harms third parties relatively little, because even without a discharge creditors
would collect little of their debts from this class of bankrupts. On the other hand, society
gains considerably from the discharge, because it is central to redeployment of the
debtor’s human capital. The premise of the bankruptcy discharge is that it increases the

69

For a detailed discussion of the various factors that affect the size and duration of that

gap, see Mann, ‘Above n 62’.
70

See Mann, ‘Above n 62’.
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likelihood that the discharged can move forward with their lives, engaging in productive
economic activity – jobs, tax payments, and attention to their family – and decreases the
likelihood that they will drift into positively harmful activities – drug use, crime, and the
like.71 The more a legal system can facilitate that redeployment, the greater the net social
benefits from the system.72
Given the decades of experience that the U.S. has had with its bankruptcy system,
it is surprising that the U.S. has not yet come to grips with the reality of the lower middleclass bankrupt who has no substantial income or assets. Many other countries have
rapidly developing and widely used systems for “no-income, no-asset” or NINA filings.
Thus, following the lead of New Zealand,73 the U.K.’s Insolvency Service has proposed a
NINA Debt Relief Order designed to be a low cost alternative for “the very poorest”

71

See Edmund Phelps, Rewarding Work (1999).

72

The concerns about the potential for positive spillover effects from the bankruptcy

process that have been so absent from the U.S. deliberations have dominated European debates in
recent years. E.g., Kilborn, Sweden, ‘Above n 2, at 439’. Kilborn, Netherlands, ‘Above n 2, at
93’.
73

Insolvency Act 2006 (N.Z.) §§ 361-377, 2006/55; see Thomas G.W. Telfer, ‘New

Zealand Bankruptcy Law Reform: The New Role of the Official Assignee and the Prospects for a
No-Asset Regime’, Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al. (eds) in Consumer Bankruptcy in Global
Perspective 247 (Hart Publishing Ltd, 2003).
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individuals.74 Available to individuals with no more than £50 in surplus income and no
more than £300 in realizable assets, the process would be entirely administrative and
have a significantly lower filing fee than the standard bankruptcy process.75

The

Insolvency Service estimates that filings under the NINA system would be at a rate of
more than 500 per million per year, a substantial number in a nation that currently has
only about 1000 bankruptcy filings per year.76
Similarly, although Canada already has a “summary administration” process with
reduced fees and process, used by about 90% of its debtors, Canada’s Personal
Insolvency Task Force recently spent considerable effort debating an even more
streamlined “fast track” process for the poorest debtors.77 Sweden is implementing this
year major reforms designed to truncate the process to speed the return of the insolvent to

74

Insolvency Service, Relief for the Indebted – An Alternative to Bankruptcy (March

2005); Insolvency Service, Relief for the Indebted – An Alternative to Bankruptcy: Summary of
Responses and Government Reply (Nov. 2005).
75

See Ramsay, ‘Functionalism and Political Economy’, ‘Above n 21, at 648-50’.

76

See Ramsay, ‘Functionalism and Political Economy’, ‘Above n 21, at 648-49’.

77

Ziegel, ‘Above n 4, at 19’. See also Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Saul Schwartz (forthcoming

2007), ‘Bankruptcy for the Poor’ 45 Osgoode Hall Law Journal (estimating that 70%-80% of
Canadian failures would qualify as NINA filers). Despite the protracted consideration, the task
force ultimately made no recommendation on the question, which remains unaddressed in
Canadian law. See Duggan, ‘Above n 4, at 872-73’.
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economic productivity.78 Recent Netherlands reforms include a “fast-track” procedure
for “extreme” cases in which neither assets nor income are expected to produce a return
to creditors. Although administrators are applying the procedure cautiously “‘to create
societal support’ for the new law in its early years,” it appears that creditors receive
distributions in no more than a fifth of all cases in the Netherlands.79 Despite the
vehement German objections to an American-style discharge, German legislators finally
recognized the need for a reduced-cost procedure for no-asset cases, a procedure that has
received a major share of filings since its introduction in 2001.80 Similarly, recognizing
that French courts were “literally submerged by the flood of over-indebtedness cases,”
French legislators in the 1990’s largely removed any judicial role in most cases.81 More
recently, French legislators adopted a new procedure for “personal recovery” to deal with
the large share of cases (about one-quarter of all filings) in which it is immediately
obvious that there is no prospect for payments to creditors.82
These systems recognize that the appropriate bankruptcy procedure for this slice
of the debtor population, what we might call the low-income low-asset (“LILA”)

78

See Kilborn, ‘Sweden’, ‘Above n 2, at 457-61’.

79

Kilborn, ‘Netherlands’, ‘Above n 2, at 107-08’.

80

See Kilborn, ‘Germany’, ‘Above n 2, at 286-88’.

81

See Kilborn, ‘France’, ‘Above n 2, at 645-47’.

82

See Kilborn, ‘France’, ‘Above n 2, at 655-61’.
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debtors,83 is a purely administrative process. For individuals that cannot reasonably be
expected to make any substantial payments, processing at the lowest possible transaction
costs should be the goal. The U.S., by contrast, continues to use a “one size fits all”
system, with procedural obstacles that are wastefully obstructive for much of the
bankrupt population.
The evidence points toward bankruptcy simplification.84 The time has come to
abandon the complicated structures, laden with bureaucratic hurdles and special-interest
provisions worthy of the Internal Revenue Code. At least for the desperately insolvent,
with no substantial income or assets, the best process is one that is stripped down to its
most central elements. First, the system should function as an administrative process
designed to provide a service at the lowest possible transaction cost rather than as an

83

I am reluctant to proliferate acronyms but the NINA terminology is highly misleading,

because the filings are not limited to those with no income or assets at all, but rather to those who
have no substantial income or assets. It is also unfortunately confusing that the same term has
come into common use to describe no-document real-estate mortgages in the subprime sector in
recent years.
84

For a parallel argument, see Jean Braucher (2006), ‘A Fresh Start for Personal

Bankruptcy Reform: The Need for Simplification and a Single Portal’ 55 American University
Law Review 1295. I note that this discussion does not consider the likelihood that debtors often
have broader social problems (patterns of drug abuse, dysfunctional family lives, etc.), and that
the bankruptcy process might be an ideal opportunity to respond to them.

As noted by

commenters at the Berlin conference for which this paper was prepared, European insolvency
reform has taken that problem much more seriously than American reform has.
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adversarial judicial process.85 In cases with low levels of assets and income there should
be few important factual disputes; disputes about the amount of claims and priorities
among creditors are important only when there is valuable collateral or nonexempt assets.
Judicial staff and attorneys in the U.S. already work hard to process these cases
economically, but the excessive requirements of the post-BAPCPA process waste social
resources.
Second, the system should provide complete and unconditional relief as quickly
as is practicable. This should occur within days or weeks after the filing, not months or
years.

Again, when the debtor has low levels of income and assets, delaying or

conditioning the discharge only delays the return of the debtor to productive economic
activity unburdened by the overhang from the debts of the past.
Finally, the system should impose stern criminal sanctions for fraud, with
adequate resources to ensure prosecutorial vigilance. A simple and expedient process
will collapse if it is tainted by fraud. Among other things, the cultural perception of those
who have gone through the process will turn negative, making it harder to persuade the
“honest but unfortunate” debtor to take advantage of the process. The simplest way to
avoid that problem is with an oversight system that imposes sufficiently severe penalties
on abusive filers. If we want to make a cultural point, the point to be made is that abuse

85

Drafters of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 rejected proposals for an administrative

process. See David T. Stanley & Marjorie Girth, Bankruptcy: Problem, Process, Reform 204-15
(Brookings 1971). Thirty years of domestic experience coupled with the evidence from abroad
justifies rethinking that decision.
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of the system cannot be condoned.

An effort to extend that condemnation to the

hopelessly insolvent, by contrast, helps none of us.
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APPENDIX

FIGURE A1: AUSTRALIAN INSOLVENCIES OVER TIME
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FIGURE A2: CANADIAN INSOLVENCIES OVER TIME

FIGURE A3: JAPANESE INSOLVENCIES OVER TIME
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FIGURE A4: UK INSOLVENCIES OVER TIME

- 44 -

February 4, 2008 Draft
FIGURE A5: UNITED STATES INSOLVENCIES OVER TIME86

86

The 2007 data points are estimated from data for the first 26 weeks of 2007. I do not

include them in the regressions discussed in the text.
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TABLE A1: SUMMARY OF REGRESSION MODEL
Total
Bankruptcies

Liquidations

Rehabilitations

1.454 (.181)
8.03***
.073 (.303)
0.24
.090 (.149)
0.60
56.89 (81.85)
0.70

1.036 (.164)
6.32**
-.082 (.198)
-0.41
.144 (.131)
1.10
83.68 (53.27)
1.57

.417 (.068)
6.09**
.018 (.082)
0.22
.053 (.017)
3.17*
-5.733(25.33)
-0.23

-704.75 (150.35)
-4.69**
-1012.01 (679.95)
-1.49
-277.60 (692.31)
-0.40
-627.28 (1106.19)
-0.57
.93
51

-795.78 (183.92)
-4.33**
-1116.98 (430.93)
-2.59#
-700.09 (469.12)
-1.49
-1119.35 (683.77)
-1.64
.93
69

199.25 (59.81)
3.33*
-115.87 (193.82)
-0.60
32.09 (186.86)
0.17
263.29 (284.49)
.93
.97
51

Economic Variables
Credit Card Debt
Consumer Debt
Credit Card Spending
Unemployment
Country Dummies
USA
Australia
Japan
UK
R²
N

# - significant at .1 level
* - significant at .05 level
** - significant at .01 level
*** - significant at .001 level
The table reports the coefficient, the robust standard error in parentheses, and the tstatistic below. The coefficients are in filings/million. Canada is the omitted case, so the
coefficients indicate the extent to which filing rates under the same conditions would fall
short of (or in the case of rehabilitation filings, exceed) Canadian rates. The regressions
use robust clusters to control for autocorrelation in the time series.
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